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The Uses Of Pleading
By EDWARD W CLEARY*
At the outset I would like to make the following assumptons:
That the only virtue of method lies m its ability to produce re-
sults accurately, inexpensively and expeditiously That the pur-
pose of rules of procedure in litigation is to provide a method of
ascertaining facts and attaching appropriate results to them.
That the place to preserve antiques is a museum. That no mem-
ber of the bar has a vested interest in any rule of procedure.
That even phuinbers work better with good tools. That common
sense and experience must furnish the yardsticks for evaluating
procedure, since litigation has not in general proved susceptible
to statistical measurement. And that the lawyers of Kentucky
are not prepared to fall in behind the first Salvation Nell who
comes down the pike beating the drum of procedural redemption.
In short, the whole judicial process is subject to continuing critical
re-evaluation.
The Orderly Disposition of Litigation
Regardless of the means employed to achieve them, these
factors seem to inhere inescapably in the concept of an orderly
judicial process:
1. Notice to the opponent which is adequate to enable him to
prepare and present his side of the case effectively;
2. Determination of the elements which are relevant to the
ultimate decision and allocating between the parties the re-
sponsibility for bringing them into the litigation;
3. Isolation of the area of actual controversy;
4. Ascertaining the govermng substantive principles.
Without them, litigation has no apparent origin or discernible
destination.
*A.B., Illinois College; J.D., University of Illinois; S.J.D., Yale Umversity.
Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law, Urbana, Illinois. Chair-
man, Committee on Civil Practice and Procedure, Illinois Bar Association, 1947-
1950, Reporter, Joint Committee on Illinois Civil Practice.
Tim USES OF PLEADING
In the conventional process of litigation, the exchange of writ-
ten, pleadings between the parties, with intervention by the court
when necessary to enforce the "rules", has been relied upon to
furnish these factors. Yet for over a hundred years pleading has
been set upon and belabored for sloth and inefficiency Dead
legal institutions continue to move their tails until sundown, and
the apparent survival of pleading may be no more than that.
Again, the survival may be real, a testimonial to the basic nature
of the objectives sought to be accomplished, if not of pleading
itself.
This article proposes to make some examination of the po-
tentialities of pleading in the disposition of litigation.
Notice to the Opponent
Reference may be made to God's calling out to Adam "Where
art thou?" before expelling the latter from the Garden.1 Wholly
aside from and long antedating the constitutional notion of due
process, common decency requires notice and opportunity to be
heard. Notice is meaningless in itself and assumes meaning only
in terms of opportumity to defend. Opportunity to defend, in turn,
becomes meaningful only as translated into "defend effectively"
An attorney preparing to defend is substantially handicapped
unless he knows not only the identity of the transaction to be
litigated but in addition the opponent's version of the transaction
and the legal character sought to be attached to it. The task of
investigating as simple an occurrence as a traffic accident is
greatly expedited by the knowledge that the client is accused,
not merely of being legally responsible for a collision, but of being
responsible because he drove through a stop sign, either negli-
gently or recklessly The information at hand should be sufficient
to lend direction and purpose to mvestigation and preparation
for defense, both as to the facts and as to the law since the
relevance of facts will depend upon the applicable law
At common law the amount of actual notice contained in
pleadings varied in marked degree among the different forms of
action. A declaration in trover or general assumpsit disclosed the
Genesis III, 9. Used for purposes of illustrating the basic character of notice
and opportunity to defend by Fortescue, J. In King v. Chancellor etc. of Cam-
bridge, 1 Strange 557, 567, 93 Eng. Rep. 698, 704 (1723), which appears in turn
in GrLLHORN, ADmuNsTRArVE LAW G-ASES Aim Co nwaNTs, (2nd ed., 1947) 231.
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identity of the transaction and the character of the litigation only
in highly generalized terms. By way of contrast, a declaration in
an action on the case or m special assumpsit contained informa-
ton substantially more detailed. The draftsmen of the Field Code
revolted against the fictitious aspects and lack of information in
some of the common-law forms and as a corrective measure laid
down the requirement that pleadings contain "facts" The en-
suing century of litigation over the nature of facts produced a
considerable amount of metaphysical nonsense and has led to the
assertion that tls aspect of the codes was a failure.2 Nevertheless,
a considerable illumination of the problem of notice resulted,
although the price at times paid by litigants for the information
seems to have been high. The suspicion lurks that, if the expres-
sion "facts" had not already been tried as a standard of measure-
ment for pleading and found to necessitate an inordinate number
of decisions essentially arbitrary in character, those now ad-
vocating its abandonment would be urging its adoption.
In terms of semantics, notice involves levels of abstraction.
The word "structure", for example, is highly abstract, while "the
house at 702 Pennsylvama Avenue, Urbana, Illinois" is specific.
So notice of litigation becomes a question roughly of whether the
information conveyed should (1) merely disclose the pendency
of litigation of an undisclosed origin or nature, (2) be limited to
bare identification of the transaction giving rise to the litigation,
(8) indicate only the character of the litigation without reference
to the originating transaction, or (4) recite in detail the party s
version of the occurrence in such fashion as to identify the trans-
action and indicate the legal significance which he attaches
CLARK, CODE: PLEADING (2nd ed., 1947) 226. "Code Pleading and Hilarv
Rules pleading require the facts essential to constitute a cause of action, the facts
wiuch must be proved at the tral, to be alleged in the pleadings. It is tis funda-
mental principle of our present system that seems to me erroneous It is a
fruitful source of the delay in litigation which is so commonly condemned; it
causes a great waste of time on the part of appellate courts; it no doubt wastes
much time in the trial courts, though proof of this is harder to obtain; and oc-
casionally it leads to an improper conclusion of a particular litigation." Whittier,
Notice Pleading, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 501, 506 (1918).
Compare Vanderbilt, C.J. in Grobart v. Society for Establishing Useful Man-
ufactures, 2 N.J. 136, 147, 65 A. 2d 833 (1949). "While the names of modem
Pleadings have dchanged, among other reasons to idi ate that we have outgrowvn
he legal techcalities and absurdities whih under the name of special pleadingbrought disgrace on the common law i the mneteenth century the essentials of
good pleading reman, and necessarily so, because the human mnd has not been
able to find over the centures any other methods of dealing on the merits with
questions of law and fact, express or implicit, in an itial pleading"
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thereto. Before justices of the peace, the usual notice is limited
to (1) Under so-called notice pleading, the information given
may be (2) or perhaps (8) Under conventional written plead-
ings something approximating (4) is ordinarily found.
Pleadings need not be permitted to bog down in a mass of
detail. The information given in a pleading should be designed
to give direction and purpose to investigation and preparation,
not to substitute for them. As details in pleadings increase, the
hazards of variance increase in almost geometrical proportion.
Moreover, there is a point at which the notice-giving function of
pleadings collides with the issue-forming function. If the plead-
ings serve as a basis for the formation of issues, it must be by
denying matters asserted or by bringing forward additional mat-
ters to avoid their legal effect, and so on. As the detail in plead-
ings increases, issues which can be formed by denials be-
come correspondingly minute and the necessity of confessing and
avoiding correspondingly greater. Carrying the process to an
extreme renders the submission of reasonably broad isues to the
tier of fact a substantial impossibility Hence injunctions are en-
countered against the pleading of "evidence", actually preventing
a party from pleading minute details even though he is willing
to disclose them and to incur the increased risk of possible claims
of vanance at the trial.3
An answer to the question whether pleadings are the best
means for affording the kind of notice envisioned herein will to a
large extent depend upon what alternative procedures are avail-
able for the purpose. None comes to mind save some species of
discovery procedure. Although extremely useful in ferreting out
detailed facts and in committing witnesses to particular stones,
discovery is often expensive and time-consuming. 4 It ought not
to be made a requsite for intelligent preparation in practically
every case. Moreover, discovery is designed to elicit facts and not
legal theories evolved by counsel whose client is being examined.,
'DeCordova v. Sanville, 165 App. Div. 28, 150 N.Y.S. 709 ( 1914), reversed
on basis of dissenting opimon in 214 N.Y. 662, 108 N.E. 1092 (1915), illustrates
the point.
' The seamy side of deposition practice is discussed ably in a note, Tactical
Use and Abuse of Depositions Under the Federal Rules, 59 YALE L.J. 117 (1949).
See also Dike, A Step Backward in the Federal Courts: Are We Returning to Trial
by Deposition? 37 A.B.A. JouRN. 17 (1951).
" The difficulties of ascertaining the underlying theory of an opponent's case
under the one form of action are pointed out in Note, 85 CORNELL L.Q. 888
(1950).
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At some stage of the proceeding, a litigant must take a stand
as to the facts and the law Requiring him to do so at a pre-
liminary stage of the litigation by a written statement of his posi-
tion places upon him no undue burden, provided sufficient flex-
ibility is retained to enable him to contend with unforeseen de-
velopments at later stages. Nor does tlis seem to be beyond the
competence of the run-of-the-mill lawyer.
Allocating the Case Between the Parties
Every case involves the necessity of determining the elements
which properly will have a bearing upon the result. Under thc
adversary theory of litigation the responsibility for bringing these
elements into the case is placed upon the parties. Since as a
practical administrative problem a plaintiff cannot be expected to
deal with every element which might conceivably affect the re-
sult, some process of allocating burdens between the parties is
required. This involves an initial determination as to what con-
stitutes a prima facie case ("cause of action") for plaintiff, suf-
ficient to justify a decision in his favor if nothing else appears.
The determination may be made by ruling on a motion for a
nonsuit or directed verdict, purely on the basis of the evidence
produced. Occasionally it is found being made by nonsuit or di-
rected verdict upon the opening statement. If, however, the de-
termination is deferred until after the actual trial has been en-
tered upon, plaintiff is likely to be caught short by a difference
between his idea and the judge s idea of what constitutes a prima
facie case. This pitfall is avoided by a preliminary decision on
the point prior to trial, when counsel can more readily prepare to
conform to the views of the court.'
Since a prima facie case does not encompass everything which
may conceivably have a bearing on the decision, after the de-
termination of what constitutes a prima facie case there will per
haps remain still further elements pertinent to a decision. Their
relevance must be determined, and a corresponding decision is
required as to which party is responsible for injecting them into
the litigation.
'Serious consideration should be given to permitting attacks upon the sub-
stantive adequacy of a case to be made only at the pleading stage. This would
entail the abolition of the present general practice of permitting failure to state
a cause of action to be raised for the first time by motion m arrest or on appeal.
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Providing for a preliminary decision of what is a prima facie
case or defense serves a further purpose m affording the basis for
a preliminary screening process whereby, without a full dress
trial, the wheat of seemingly worthy actions and defenses may be
separated from the chaff of those obviously not meritmg further
consideration. While the proportion of cases thus finally dis-
posed of may be relatively small, the availability of the screening
procedure seems bound to have a healthy deterrent effect and
disposition to clarify in all cases.7 Added thought and care in
preliminary design are calculated to improve the finished struc-
ture.'
The aspect of pleading just discussed obviously possesses
important notice aspects. If the fundamental task of giving the
opponent notice is to be delegated to the pleadings, no great ad-
ditional extension is involved in making the pleadings further
serve as a basis for determining the factors relevant to the case
and allocating responsibility for them among the parties.
Isolating the Area of Actual Controversy
Although frequently described as "issue pleading", a promi-
nent weakness of pleading at common law was its approach to
the formation of issues. This weakness stemmed from two sources:
(1) lack of machinery for compelling truthfulness in pleadings,
and (2) failure to defflie issues with clarity
If pleadings are to serve to eliminate false issues and to define
the area of actual controversy, some means must be provided for
making them at least reasonably truthful, thereby disclosing
whether there is present m the case any genume issue of fact re-
quiring a trial on the facts. The Field Code sought to achieve
"It is possible to continue allowing accident cases, for example, to be
brought at no greater risk than that of filing fees, to continue the possibility of
any case, however uncertain of merit, surviving till trial, and to continue to dump
masses of substantially unanalvzed issues into the over-filled trial machine; but
to do so means growing congestion with a search for solution outside the courts."
Oliphant's introduction to GREENBAUM AND BEADE, THE KnzG s BENCH MASTERS
"'Mi ENGLISH INTERLOCUTORY PACTICE, 1932, xv.
"We no longer insist upon technical rules of pleading, but it will ever be
difficult in a jury trial to segregate issues wluch counsel do not separate m their
pleading, preparation or thinking. Pleadings will serve the purpose of sharpemng
and limiting the issues only if claims-based on negligence are set forth separately
from those based on violation of the appliance acts." Jackson, J., O'Donnell v.
Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co., 338 U.S. 384, 392, 70 S. Ct. 200, 205, 94 L.Ed. 187, 193
(1949).
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this end by providing for the verification of pleadings. The result
was far from a complete success. The general character of state-
ments commonly found in pleadings renders charges of perjury
difficult to substantiate, thus depriving the procedure of much of
its effectiveness. Nevertheless, the practice has its useful aspects,
and a modern system of procedure may well include a provision
whereby verification at any stage calls for verification of all sub-
sequent pleadings unless excused by the court for cause.
Summary judgment procedure has proved to be a more effec-
tive means of eliminating false issues. Unfortunately it has been
set up as a proceeding separate from although auxiliary to the
pleadings. No reason is apparent why the aspects of summary
judgment cannot be incorporated directly in the pleadings. Under
present practices, plaintiff asks for judgment in his complaint.
Then he files a motion for summary judgment, again asking for
judgment, and in effect saying that this time, he really means
it. Under an integrated procedure, if plaintiff chose to attach
to his complaint affidavits or other duly authenticated documents
containing sufficient competent evidence to establish each ele-
ment of his prima facie case at a trial, he would be entitled to a
speedy judgment unless defendant with his answer presented
similar evidence raising a genuine issue of fact. Defendant in
his turn could initiate the process by similarly supporting his
answer and would be entitled to a speedy judgment in the event
plaintiff failed to file counter-affidavits raising a genuine issue
of fact. In the event of trial, the affidavits would not be evidence
for the party filing them but would be available as admissions if
made by a party-opponent and for impeachment.
Penalties for unfounded allegations or denials perhaps have
some deterrent effect,9 and demands to admit facts of an evi-
dentiarv nature or the genumess of documents, particularly the
latter, possess great utility i9
In order to clarify issues, the general denial should be abol-
'As in Illinois Civil Practice Act, § 41. "Allegations and denials, made with-
out reasonable cause and not in good faith, and found to be untrue, shall subject
the party pleading the same to the payment of such reasonable expenses, to be
summarily taxed by the court at the trial, as may have been actuallv incurred by
the other party, by reason of such untrue pleading."
" As in Illinois Supreme Court Rules 17 and 18 and Federal Rules 34 and 36.
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ished and specific denials required." The persistence of the gen-
eral denial is a fantastic anachronism m the Federal Rules. 12 It is
calculated to encourage capricious denials and frequently raises
problems as to precisely what is put m issue. Specific denials re-
quire serious piece-by-piece consideration of the allegations in
the complaint and leave small room for doubt as to what plaintiff
is called upon to prove. To be effective they must really be
specific, by denying in the language of the complaint itself, with
proper attention to avoiding conjunctive denials and negatives
pregnant. Blanket denials of the allegations of an entire para-
graph are only a general denial on a lesser scale and ought not
to be tolerated. The use of specific denials possesses a further ad-
vantage in furnishing a clearer basis for the infliction of penalties
for unfounded denials.
With adequate provisions for summary disclosure of the ab-
sence of genuine issues of fact and for clear-cut definition of the
scope of issues which do exist, pleadings seem to constitute a
sensible means for ascertaining the area within which actual con-
troversy exists.
Ascertaining the Applicable Substantive Rules
A decision must at some time be made as to whether facts
advanced by plaintiff are a sufficient basis for recovery and
whether facts advanced by defendant are a sufficient defense.
Tins is a decision to be made in terms of substantive law What
constitutes a prima facie case or defense, although often pur-
portedly solved in procedural terms, is in fact a problem of sub-
stantive law Hence it seems to be apparent that the principles
of substantive law upon which the rights of the parties depend
ought to be ascertainable at an early stage of the litigation.
Since conventionally substantive rules are not alleged in
pleadings, the rule which the pleader seeks to invoke can only
be determined by inference from the facts pleaded. In the mine-
run cases the theory of the complaint, or defense, can easily be
determined from inspection of the pleading. In other cases the
I" For example, Illinois Civil Practice Act, § 40 (1) provides, "General issues
shall not be employed, and every answer and subsequent pleading shall contain
an explicit adrmssion or denial of each allegation of the pleading to which it
relates."
'4 F.R. 8 (b).
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substantive theory may be elusive and obscure, and determina-
tion whether the elements alleged are adequate under the rule
runs into a barrier.
A possible solution lies in requiring that a pleading actually
state the substantive theory upon which it is drawn, as in the
Scottish pleas in law,13 but this step seems to be calculated to
introduce a further complicating factor probably destined to
acquire the hardening of the arteries more or less inherent in
procedural forms. Nevertheless, some means of clarification of
substantive theory seems definitely to be desirable, without the
painful and time-consuming process of step-bystep demurrer.
14
The Problem
These, then, are the capabilities of pleading. Yet the sad
truth is that in practice they are too frequently unrealized, and
therefore a large measure of modem procedural reform has been
directed to supplementing the deficiencies of the traditional
pleading pattern. Unfortunately the attack has generally been
piecemeal, leading to the introduction of a proliferation of sup-
plementary procedures designed to accomplish specific limited
objectives. As a result, practice before trial has grown by a
process of accretion to resemble a contraption pictured in a Rube
Goldberg cartoon. Onto conventional demurrer practice have
been engrafted demands to admit, motions to make more definite
and certain, motions for judgment on the pleadings, motions to
strike pleadings as sham, motions for summary judgment, de-
mands to admit, interrogatories to parties, discovery of docu-
ments and other items, plus depositions upon oral or 'ritten in-
terrogatories. Despite this impressive array, no one seems to be
prepared to abandon pleading entirely i" The confusion does not
seem to be calculated to make litigation cheap and expeditious.
Most of the auxiliary devices possess great utility as auxiliary
devices, but they were not designed to furnish the central theme
" Millar, Civil Pleading in Scotland, 32 M'iH. L. REV. 545, 562-565, 577-581
(1932)." Note, 85 CORNELL L.Q. 888 (1950).
" For example, a reading of Moore s discussion of the purposes of pleadings
under the Federal Rules leaves the reader with the impression that pleadings are
still necessary but ought to be gotten over with as easily and painlessly as possible.
Just what they. are for is left in considerable doubt. 2 MOORE s FEDERAL PRACTICE
1606.
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and framework which are indispensable to orderly litigation.
Hence pleading ought not to be abandoned but efforts ought to
be directed to increasing its effectiveness.
A fundamental attack upon the deficiencies of pleading and
pretrial procedures generally seems to require a move in the
direction of integrating the participation of the trial judge. The
pretrial conference, while designed to introduce an element of
informal flexibility, too frequently has proved to be merely one
more thing to go through prior to trial. Notions as to the purpose
of the pretrial conference ought radically to be revised, changing
the name if that seems likely to encourage a different approach.""
It the lawyers of Kentucky can accomplish a sufficiently funda-
mental revision to retain the useful charactenstics of the aux-
iliarv procedures and at the same time incorporate them with
pleading into one reasonably integrated pretrial mechanism, they
will have to then" credit an outstanding accomplishment.
Basically pleading encounters difficulty at two points: failure
to keep its objectives in view and delay m accomplishing them.
It seems very likely that the source of both troubles to a great
extent lies in the piecemeal and painful character of demurrer
practice and its lineal descendants. Some mechamsm is necessary
in order to coerce the unwilling pleader in the direction of ulti-
mate pleading objectives. Traditionally the means employed has
been the demurrer, with its counterparts of today not greatly dis-
similar in nature, painstakingly hammering out each step before
the next could be taken. Delay is not only engendered,- it is
invited. In fact the word demurrer means "to pause." Further-
more, fragnentary treatment seems inevitably calculated to de-
tract attention from broad objectives. Deferring any considera-
tion of the sufficiency of any pleading until all pleadings have
been filed may well be the answer.
Under this proposal the parties would be required to file all
pleadings, including complaint, answer and reply, within rather
brief specified times. Then for the first tune would pleading
questions be considered. Cerjtai difficulties at once become ap-
" judge Fee deplores the decline of pleading under the Federal Rules but
admits its inadequacy to deal with complex modem transactions. He envisions
the pretrial conference as a projection of the pleading process. The Lost Horizon
of Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 48 COL. L. REv. 491
(1948).
KENTUCKY LAW JOuENAL
parent: unnecessary answers would be filed n cases where plain-
tiff could not state a cause of action; the inadequacy of a pre-
ceding pleading would at times render the framing of an adequate
responsive pleading difficult or impossible. Others no doubt will
be raised. The prospective gains, however, which would accrue
from proceeding with dispatch and with the whole warp and
woof of the case at hand when problems of prelimmaiy design
are considered seem calculated more than to offset any apparent
disadvantages."7
A Suggested Formula
1. Pleadings shall disclose the elements of the claim or
defense in sufficient detail to inform the opposing party of the
nature of the case which he is called upon to meet and to enable
the court to ascertain whether there is probable merit in the
claim of the pleader."8
2. Every allegation not specifically denied shall be deemed
to be admitted.
3. No objection to any pleading shall be filed until all
pleadings have been filed.
4. No interrogatories shall be put and no demands to admit
shall be made, except with leave of court.19
5. After all pleadings have been filed, the case shall upon
'The approach suggested bears some similarity to the proposals of the late
Professor Simpson in A Possible Solution of the Pleading Problem, 53 HARv. L.
REv. 169 (1939). However, Professor Simpson and I differ rather radically in our
basic analyses. While he sees the desirability of greater integration of proceedings
before trial, he would use notice pleading as the basis and place far more author-
ity in the hands of the court. My own feeling is that the traditional degree of
control over the actual drafting of the pleadings and framing of issues ought to be
left in the bands of the lawyers and that the pretrial hearing ought to be a means
for making the participation of the lawyers more effective rather than a means of
undermining the adversary theory of litigation. I do not adhere to the Great-
White-Father theory of the trial judge.
"8 "General propositions do not decide concrete cases." Holmes, J., Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76, 25 S.Ct. 539, 547, 49 L.Ed. 937, 949 (1905). The
gloss which has been accumulated by the code "cause of action" seems to require
the abandonment of the phrase if objectives are to be kept m view. The weasel
wording of Federal Rule 8 (a), that a complaint shall contain "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" has un-
doubtedly had considerable effect upon the attitude of the federal judges. If we
are to paraphrase "cause of action" I would spell it out in somewhat more de-
tailed objectives.
" See Caskey and Young, Some Further Comments Upon Rule 33 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 33 VA. L. REV. 125 (1947).
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motion of either party be placed upon the pretrial docket and a
pretrial hearing shall be held.
6. At the pretrial hearing the following matters shall at the
request of either party be considered.
a. Objections that pleadings do not conform with the require-
ments of paragraph 1 above, that the theory of substantive
law upon which the pleader relies is msufficient or not ap-
parent, or that the pleadings contain matter irrelevant to the
merits of the controversy
b. Preliminary r-ulings upon the admissibility of evidence
proposed to be introduced at the trial.
c. Proposals to submit interrogatones or demands to admit.
d. The extent to which genume issues of fact exist, as dis-
closed by the pleadings, affidavits and depositions.
e. Other matters which may aid in the disposition of the case.
7 The pretrial hearing may from time to time be continued
as appropriate.
8. During the pretrial hearing the court may enter order or
orders:
a. Permitting or requiring the amendment of pleadings.
b. Requiring the clarification of the substantive law upon
winch a pleader relies.
c. Striking from pleadings matter irrelevant to the merits of
the controversy
d. Permitting the submission of interrogatones or demands
to admit.
e. Determining the extent to which genuine issues of fact
exist in the case.
f. Entering final judgment for any party entitled thereto as
a matter of law, upon the uncontroverted facts of the case.
g. Reciting any agreements reached between the parties aid-
ing in the disposition of the case.
